

National Institutes of Health Dual-Use Screening Survey for RDs/ HPRDs and all associated amendments

PI (print name): _____

Institute: _____

For DOHS use only:

RD / HPRD #: _____

Biological research is considered 'dual-use' in nature if the methodologies, materials or results could be used in some manner to cause public harm. To ensure all NIH research is given due consideration as to whether the planned experiments include 'dual-use research of concern' (DURC), where results may possibly be used *readily* for malicious purposes, the following questions must be answered prior to the onset of research. Affirmative answers do not necessarily automatically indicate research as dual-use or DURC, nor will it usually delay experimental progress, it will merely indicate further review and consideration may be warranted as the research advances.

This form must be submitted with all rDNA (RD) and human pathogen (HPRD) registrations/amendments

<u>Screening Questions</u>	Yes	No	N/A
A. Will the intermediate or final product of your experiments:			
1. enhance the harmful consequences of the agent or toxin? (for example, will it enable weaponization* of an agent or toxin, or enhance the virulence of a pathogen, or render a non-pathogen virulent?)			
2. disrupt immunity or the effectiveness of an immunization against the agent or toxin without clinical or agricultural justification? (for example, make a vaccine less effective)			
3. confer to the agent or toxin resistance to clinically or agriculturally useful prophylactic or therapeutic interventions against that agent or toxin or facilitate their ability to evade detection methodologies? (for example, confer a drug resistance trait to microorganism(s) in the study that could compromise the use of appropriate or conventional drugs to control or detect these microorganism(s) as disease agents in humans, veterinary medicine, or agriculture)?			
4. increase the stability, transmissibility, or ability to disseminate the agent or toxin?			
5. alter the host range or tropism of the agent or toxin?			
6. enhance the susceptibility of a host population to the agent or toxin?			
7. generate or reconstitute an eradicated or extinct agent or toxin?			
B. Will synthetic biology⁺ techniques be used to construct a pathogen, toxin or potentially harmful product?			
C. Even if your planned research does not involve <i>any</i> of the aforementioned criteria, and realizing your work or results could conceivably be misused, is there the potential for your data/product to be <i>readily</i> utilized to cause public harm?			

* In this context, weaponization refers to the enhanced dispersion, deliverability, survivability or pathogenesis of an agent or toxin.

⁺Synthetic biology includes, but is not limited to, techniques of molecular biology, chemistry and genetics that would allow for the *de novo* synthesis or reverse engineering of genes, gene products or entire functional organisms.

For any question that was answered "yes", please provide sufficient information to allow for review of the indicated concern:

After considering the above answers, do you believe there is the potential for your research data/product to be readily utilized to cause public harm? Yes No

PI Signature: _____

Date: _____

Reviewed by DOHS IBC: _____

Date: _____

Information regarding the dual-use dilemma in biological research may be found at: <http://www.serceb.org/dualuse.htm>.

This questionnaire conforms with the US Policy for Oversight of Life Sciences Dual Use Research of Concern